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WG7 ISR and Intelligence Analysis

Page history last edited by Tim Elder 14 years, 6 months ago

WG-07 ISR and Intelligence Analysis

 

Chair:

Tim Elder, Lockheed Martin,tim.elder@lmco.com

 

Co-Chairs:

Mr. James (Vic) Fink, US Army Intelligence Centre, james.fink@us.army.mil

Dr. Ronald Tuttle, USAF Institute of Technology,Ronald.Tuttle@afit.edu

CDR Eric Law, USN, OPNAV N81, eric.law@navy.mil

Mr. Bryan Tollefson, USN, Surveillance Systems, CODE 56370, bryan.tollefson@navy.mil

Mr. Scott Schoeb, USA, ISR Branch, CIMCAD Division, USAMSAA, scott.schoeb@us.army.mil

 

Advisor:

Don Timian, Army Test and Evaluation Command, donald.timian@atec.army.mil

 

Prospectus for the 77th MORS Symposium; Fort Leavenworth, KS; 16-18 June 2009

 

For the foreseeable future, the United States will maintain the technological edge in "battlefield awareness" and precision-guided weaponry. However, in the decades to come, we will face three types of threats:  Asymmetric threats in which state and nonstate adversaries avoid direct engagements with the US military but devise strategies, tactics, and weapons to minimize US strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses; Strategic threats, including mobile missile and submarine threats, in which Russia, China, and probably North Korea, Syria, Iran, will have the capability to strike the United States or their allies; and Regional military threats in which a few countries maintain large military forces with a mix of Cold War and post-Cold War concepts and technologies.  Many of these potential adversaries are undertaking increasingly sophisticated Cover, Concealment, Camouflage, Denial and Deception (C3D2).  These efforts are designed to hide key activities, facilities, and capabilities (e.g. mobilization or attack preparations, WMD programs, advanced weapons systems developments, treaty noncompliance, etc.) from US intelligence; to manipulate US perceptions and assessments of those programs; and to protect key capabilities from US precision strike platforms.  With the increase in dynamic targeting, smaller yield weapons, a desire for reduced collateral damage and a large and growing inventory of coordinate-seeking weapons, special emphasis will be placed on the ability of intelligence assets to provide accurate Target Location Accuracy. Foreign knowledge of U.S. intelligence and military operations capabilities is essential to effective C3D2.  Advances in indications and warning capabilities; the growing availability of camouflage, concealment, deception, and obscurant materials; advanced technology for and experience with building underground facilities; and the growing use of fiber optics and encryption will increase the C3D2 challenge.

The 2004 Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act calls for actionable intelligence tailored to the threats of the 21st century.  Key to producing actionable intelligence from raw information is having highly trained and skilled professionals, who comprehend advanced analytical techniques.  We must continue to evolve and advance analytical training with interactive high fidelity tools and modeling and simulation data when real world data is not available.  Papers that explore multidisciplinary themes are highly desired.  Papers are also solicited in the areas of foreign use of Operations Research (OR) to support intelligence, OR support to joint and coalition intelligence, and the use of new or nontraditional methodologies/sciences in support of the intelligence community.

 

Charter

 

Purpose: The purpose of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Intelligence Analysis Working Group is to promote the exchange of analytical techniques, permit the peer review of methods and results, and provide a means for continued growth of military operations research and related disciplines as applied to intelligence analysis and ISR across the spectrum of peace, crisis, Stability and Support Operations (SASO), and Major Combat Operations (MCO).

 

Discussion: Traditionally, Operations Research has considered the use of quantitative mathematical and statistical methods to such areas as collection management, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) analysis, automated exploitation aids, etc.  However, historically Operations Research has also included the organized use of multidisciplinary teams combining less mathematical areas such as psychology, political science, cultural specialists, etc. in concert with probabilists, optimizers, and others to solve hard problems, including those in the intelligence arena.

 

The ISR and Intelligence Analysis Working Group seeks to provide a forum for intelligence analysts to present their work – whether it is focused on optimizing ISR assets, providing actionable intelligence to commanders and decision makers, or the use of Operations Research techniques by foreign military organizations.

 

 

 

 

 

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